Egyptian blogger Eman AbdelRahman aka LastoAdri. Courtesy of Oso on Flickr.

Why did the Mubarak regime turn the internet off?

That was the question I asked the attendees of a gathering recently at the Oxford Internet Institute looking at the role of the internet in the revolutions sweeping the Middle East. The question gives us, I suggested, a route into understanding the other side of the equation, ie. How authoritarian regimes maintain their power. It therefore connects us to a long standing debate that has encompassed media studies, cultural anthropology, political science and more.

My provisional response was to suggest that turning the internet off was more than anything a gesture of power that shed light on how an authoritarian regime perceived its ability to exercise control. Yes, turning off the internet was an attempt to stop activists using free publishing tools online to organise protests and share information. Yes, turning off the internet worked to prevent information reaching the outside world and so perhaps preserved for one more day alliances with powers who were not going to like the violence and repression that had to be meted out to protect regime interests. But perhaps more importantly, turning off the internet was a gesture of a power relation. We can do this. You cannot stop us. We are in power, you are not. Targeting the internet as a way of stating the existence of a relationship of power just goes to show how embedded the internet had become in Egyptian society, and that its long term role had been to help render the tools of authoritarianism far less effective. In a paradoxical way then, the Egyptian government’s decision was a statement of its powerlessness in the face of the long term impact of the internet.

A number of caveats are necessary. A revolution depends on many factors coming together at the same time: the fuel of long term economic grievances and repression, a cadre of young people willing to die, the fuse of a revolutionary setting – in this case that incredible moment broadcast on Al Jazeera and other satellite networks when President Ben Ali fled Tunisia in the face of the unstoppable force of public protests. Perhaps more importantly for this debate is the caveat that illiteracy and poverty exclude many millions of people from social media in Egypt. Despite these caveats, and without wanting to be trapped in the eddies of the causality debate, social media was influential enough for it to be worth discussing. According to statistics shared by the impressive Noha Atef – founder of a blog documenting torture and Twitter user extraordinaire – there are perhaps as many as 21 million internet subscriptions in Egypt, a figure that demonstrates how the internet has come to play an important role in the country. A middle class phenomenon perhaps, but powerful in its reach.

In taking the longer term view, rather than focusing on the immediate examples of how social media were used in the protests, we can look at the role of social media in helping to undermine the tools of authoritarianism. Three areas are of particular interest: 1) the ways in which authoritarian states obstruct the Freedom of to assemble, 2) the way in which authoritarian regimes control public space with propaganda, objects of fear and the cult of personality, and 3) the ways in which repressive regimes attempt to block critical thinking and freedom of expression.

Freedom of Assembly

Many of the protest movements sweeping the Middle East have gathered pace in towns outside the capital. Sidi Bouzid, Suez, Daraa, Benghazi. But in each case, the protest movement needs to also take hold in the capital, and more specifically in a symbolic location and central gathering place. Only that way could the protest take on the regime in a national sense – a blow to the heart. The best example of this was Tahrir Square which became effectively proto-liberated space for the protesters. It represented what you might describe as ‘sacred national space’ where peace and fraternity reigned amongst those committed to the revolution and both Muslims and Christians could pray alongside one another. A junction at the heart of the capital city, Tahrir became the beating heart of the revolution, so much so that Al Jazeera and other news networks had to broadcast the scene there almost continuously to all corners of the country and beyond. By reclaiming Tahrir Square and fighting every regime attempt to clear it, the Egyptian protesters reclaimed the heart of Egypt for themselves.

Facebook pages and Twitter hashtags provided similar gathering places. These were assembly points that attracted the focus of the many (in the case of Twitter the focus of the most active activists and international networks). On Facebook Kulina Khaled Said and the April 6 Youth Movement were prominent throughout. So too was the January Revolution Day against Torture Poverty Corruption and Unemployment. On Twitter, the hashtag that gathered most attention was #jan25. To be prominent, hashtags and Facebook pages necessarily required wide community participation – just as holding Tahrir required a big number of dedicated protesters in it for the long haul. The impact and attention of these gathering places forced the regime to acknowledge the protesters. Unlike regime media that could largely ignore the protests at the start, to interrupt these gathering points either required using them – thereby acknowledging them – to spread the regime line, or removing access to them altogether (by blocking the service or turning the internet off).

The focus here on date and time is particularly interesting. Why use a date for a revolutionary hashtag? Many other protest movements have used a date on Twitter too – Tunisia, Libya, Bahrain, Syria. So the trend is deeply rooted. A date is important because it suggests rupture. Although – as Noha Atef pointed out – the revolution began many years before in the gradual activism of a new cohort of web-savvy young people, the symbolic date of rupture was January 25 in Egypt. Before this date, Mubarak reigned supreme. After this date he was effectively ruined. The date announced the rebirth of the nation, the narrative moment in which Egyptians took history into their own hands, purging themselves of the past ills imposed on them by a corrupt regime. This date of rebirth was in many ways more significant than the date on which Hosni Mubarak stepped down – as the continued use of the hashtag attests.

Dates, landmarks and national narratives are deeply interrelated in Egypt, inscribed as they are into the history books and the geography of Cairo. Many of the bridges and major thoroughfares are named after important historical dates (October 6, May 15, July 26). The hashtag had a similar connection to Tahrir. It was both a space, a landmark and a new national narrative, written by the community outside of the control of the regime. In using it, Egyptians broke through the atomization enforced on them through years of Emergency Law preventing them from freely assembling to demand their rights and influence policy. Just as the community collectively broke through the barrier of fear by taking to the streets in such numbers on 25 January, numbers so large that individually the Egyptian protesters faced a greatly reduced risk of reprisal from the regime, so Egyptians took courage in collectively joining Facebook pages and contributing to the #jan25 hashtag on mass.

Propaganda and the Cult of Personality

Authoritarian regimes flourished in the days of old media in large part because the one-to-many paradigm of radio, television and print favoured central control on the distribution of information and ideas. Just as public space could be cluttered with the paraphernalia of the ruler (statues, portraits, banners, insignia on cars), so public media could be cluttered with the propaganda of the regime. This helped to spread fear and furnish the idea that everyone else was wildly supportive of the ruling regime (a process in sharp focus in Bashar Al-Assad’s speech to parliament on 30 March 2011). Some scholars have suggested that the effectiveness of this propaganda quickly wears thin with the people; it is not so much then that Egyptians believed everything Mubarak said or Al Ahram told them, rather they had no power to prevent this propaganda intermediating between their lives and the lives of their fellow citizens. Rather, propaganda acted as a code for describing acceptable behaviour and denied the viability of alternatives to regime rule. As political parties, syndicates and other public bodies are quickly co-opted by the regime, so ‘independent’ mass media are co-opted to distribute regime messages and sideline challenges. Public debate largely ceases to exist or is marginalised, so there is little opportunity to take part in public debate. The regime flourishes in this environment.

But what happens when you have publishing tools that provide for dense inter-connected networks? Egyptian use of Twitter is the perfect example of this. Twitter is the fruition of trends in the web that emphasize networked inter-linked information where everything is social. Everything is linked: users are hyperlinks, topics (hashtags) are hyperlinks, tweets are hyperlinks, replies are connected hyperlinks. Moreover, Twitter is a gateway to other content through traded links. So tools like Discus allow you to see all the users gathering around a particular url on Twitter. Retweets and suggested links broaden and enrich the connections users are willing to take part in between one another. Egyptian activists took this opportunity to build their own web of people and information which was integrated over time into the global link economy.

The point here is not to eulogize the brilliance of Twitter, but to show that its functions – which are the result of evolving trends in the social web – and the breadth of its global community provide for a dense network of people and information which is a direct threat to the stability of regime propaganda through old media. In their own way, Wordpress, Facebook, YouTube and all the other popular web services do a similar thing. In a multi-polar networked paradigm that crosses barriers of location, culture and ideology it is much harder for any one set of interests to take full control. The atomizing effect of regime propaganda is sorely undermined. Simply put, social tools escape the authoritarian suppression of sociability (unless you turn the internet off).

Governments can’t be ‘social’ – only people in communities can. The US Defence Department is surely learning this. So the Mubarak regime’s efforts to insert itself into the evolving online network was doomed to failure. Just as it could not stir enough people onto the streets to counter the revolutionary demonstrations, so it could not tackle the weight of community action online when the floodgates truly opened (#jan25). The regime’s decision to send threatening text messages through the Vodafone network are a case in point. They did not stem the tide of the Egyptian Revolution. Similarly, Mubarak’s televised addresses had the feeling of watching history, literally. This is how the regime treated Egyptians for so long. It was captivating for western audiences to see a dictator in the act of dictating. The content of those speeches could never have met protester expectations precisely because protesters called for Mubarak to go, and in the absence of any meaningful progressive political platform from the regime (was there ever one?), the televised addresses were surely designed simply to show who was in power. But they actually worked the other way. They provided fuel for the community to enervate its critiques and lampoon a dictator. The addresses enhanced the sense of the clumsy powerlessness of the regime, its crass ineptitude, its emptiness. The display demonstrated that the regime’s power had long since evaporated. Suddenly the idea of ruling a country for 30 years looked something incredible and unlikely.

Freedom of Speech

When I was living in Egypt in 2006, I came to know two middle class female bloggers (muhagabat) in their early twenties who blogged anonymously. My interest in their blog stemmed from the fact that they were not tackling overtly ‘political’ topics, but nevertheless their blog was deeply political. They used the blog as a critique of their family life, and particularly to vent against their parents and wider social norms. Why can’t we live in a place of our own outside the family home? Why are we expected to get married and have children? Why won’t my dad let me come back to the house when I want? Around this agenda gathered a community of peer bloggers who offered support and self-affirmation. This small community worked to take on bloggers with opposing world views who stumbled across the blog from the wider public.

The interesting point here was that by blogging and gathering anonymously in this way, the group began to formulate and disseminate a social critique that previously could not have been propagated in public space. So the blog acted for them as a node of critique. This kind of interaction was being repeated among the young educated Egyptian middle class right across Egypt, creating new avenues for free expression and debate, though largely ignored by the media pundits interested more in activists fighting torture. The long term repercussions of this evolution in the Egyptian public sphere cannot be underestimated. Though gradual in terms of the life span of social media, this change is rapid and profound in the broader social history of the Middle East, and surely its impacts will be felt for a long time to come.

Conclusion

We cannot boil revolutions down to a simple equation such as [social media + young people + grievances = revolution]. But then nor can we ignore social media use as an important and growing trend that has direct implications for the way in which authoritarian regimes exercise power. We should be cautious about many aspects of social media – linguistic hegemony, increased status competition, the erosion of privacy protections. Nevertheless, we should celebrate the long term impact of social media use that has created a more networked, community-led, editable public sphere.

Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the IAEA. Picture by Marc Darchinger, Berlin

When Egypt’s  President Hosni Mubarak came to power 28 years ago, the Berlin Wall still had another eight years to stand, AIDS was only just being recognized as a disease, and the Ford Cortina had another year to run on the automaker’s production lines.

Little wonder then that some people in Egypt would like to see a fresh-faced successor to take the reins in elections slated for 2011.

But not, by any means, everyone.

“Respecting the current constitution ensures that the  high post [of president] is occupied by the one who is worthy of it and qualified for it,” the leading state newspaper Al Ahram said in an editorial.  ”The candidate should be aware of all the internal as well as the external affairs. It is not good enough to be an expert on nuclear disarmament. ”

This widely publicized editorial was designed as a thinly veiled attack at the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (the IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, following a statement he made early December that he would consider running for Egyptian president if the elections were guaranteed to be fair.

The Egyptian state media see ElBaradei as a threat, and so have taken the attack to his view that the country needs a new constitution – which they say is a sign he’s out of touch with Egypt:

“If the aim was, as he claims, for us all to work on establishing a society that serves humanity and ensures everyone the right of a prosperous secure life, then our decisions should draw largely on this status quo and not on some readings or analysis made by enemy forces that seek to stir chaos and instability. Those forces open the door for interference in the Egyptian internal affairs.

“We learned by experience that a society cannot be built except by its own people. Enough of the interference and enough of what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan and the disasters that befell their peoples. Several intrusive policies had caused enough difficulties to our  country and opened the door for the “creative chaos” that George Bush Junior told us about before he was gone, leaving behind his political errors and disasters. Dr. ElBaradei now wants to repeat those mistakes, thinking he could cause embarrassment to Egypt and its political system.”

The fear of ElBaradei is shared by democracy activists who have labored against what they perceive as regime injustices.

At the front of the pack is Ayman Nour – Hosni Mubarak’s only rival in the first ‘open’ elections of 2005. He was arrested nine months ahead of the 2005 poll, and only released four years later.

According to the Egyptian press, he sees ElBaradei as a rival to his own presidential ambitions.

In  a headline, leading independent news outlet Al Masry Al Youm (The Egyptian Today) paraphrased Nour’s position:

“Nour: Elbaradei’s position is “vague” and his statement is a “diplomatic no” to presidential candidacy”

«نور»: موقف البرادعى «غامض».. وبيانه «اعتذار دبلوماسى» عن عدم الترشح للرئاسة

The paper itself was doubtful as to ElBaradei’s chances:

“The bitter reality always gives some people the tendency to dream. This is the case with the next presidential elections in Egypt. The names of the candidates legally expected makes people dream of those who are not, according to the constitution, eligible for candidacy. The people have the right to dream about Egypt’s presidency, which is by the way one of the advantages of the amendment to Article 76 of the constitution. It is not yet anyone’s right to sell this dream to the Egyptians as reality.”

لواقع المرير دائماً يجعل بعض الناس تتجه إلى الأحلام.. هذا هو حال الانتخابات الرئاسية المقبلة فى مصر.. فواقع أسماء المرشحين المتوقعين قانونياً يجعل الناس تحلم بأسماء لن تتمكن ـ وفقاً للدستور ـ من الترشح، ومن حق الناس أن تحلم برئاسة مصر، وهذه بالمناسبة إحدى مزايا تعديل المادة ٧٦ من الدستور، لكن ليس من حق أحد أن يبيع هذا الحلم أو الوهم للمصريين على أساس أنه حقيقة

At the same time, state ministers have been working the rounds, making sure the Egyptian people know that ElBaradei is not an ‘appropriate’ candidate for President – as Youm7 (The Seventh Day) reported:

“Dr. Mufid Shehab, Minister of State for Legal and parliamentary Affairs, denounced the talks circulating these days about ELBaradei’s candidacy for the presidency of Egypt. He ruled out such possibility justifying that ElBaradei has little to do with political matters, the Arab World relations, and the Palestinian cause. He added that he was a prominent Egyptian scientist who had no political experience and did not know much about parliamentary life.”

استنكر الدكتور مفيد شهاب وزير الدولة للشئون القانونية والمجالس النيابية، ما يتم ترويجه هذه الأيام عن ترشيح البرادعى نفسه لانتخابات رئاسة الجمهورية، مستبعداً حدوث ذلك لكون البرادعى، على حد وصفه، لم يتوغل فى العالم السياسى ولا العلاقات العربية ولا القضية الفلسطينية، فهو عالم مصرى جليل ليس له خبرة سياسية ولا يعلم عن الحياة البرلمانية والحزبية كثيراً

In Al Ahram, columnist Mohammad  Al-Saadani put the state position more succinctly still:

“It seems as if ElBaradei has strayed into an area where he doesn’t belong!”

يبدو ان البرادعي قد انزلقت قدماه الي ملعب ليس ملعبه

Passionate in support of ElBaradei, however, stands El Shorouk – another of Egypt’s leading independent newspapers.

In an opinion piece in the paper, veteran Egyptian columnist Salama Ahmed Salama suggested that ElBaradei’s minimum conditions to stand for the presidency in 2011 (ie. that the elections be fair) are unachievable – but worthy nonetheless:

“Does this mean that ElBaraedi is asking for unrealistic terms that are even not present in any democratic system worldwide? Isn’t he really aware of the fact that the implementation of the said terms necessitates the full belief of the governing regime in democracy and its outcomes. Not only that, their implementation also hinges upon the consensus among the political powers about the necessity to face both implicit and explicit imbalances and irregularities in the political arena. Moreover, they will not be implemented save for giving full reign to the people to practice their political rights without dictation, suppression or rigging. Undoubtedly, ElBaradei knows this quite well. Hence he is suggesting such terms that everyone knows cannot be realized overnight. They need effort in addition to a change in opinions and mentality ( of those in power). What makes the matter worse is that ElBaradei looks as if he is crying in wilderness.”

هل معنى ذلك فعلا أن البرادعى يطالب بشروط مستحيلة، لا مثيل لها فى النظم الديمقراطية الأخرى فى العالم.. وهل يغيب فعلا عن إدراكه أن مثل هذه الشروط يتطلب لتحقيقها إيمان جماعة الحكم بالديمقراطية وتبعاتها، وتوافق القوى السياسية على ضرورة تصحيح العوار الكامن والظاهر فى الحياة السياسية، وتمكين الشعب من ممارسة حرياته وحقوقه السياسية دون وصاية أو إملاء، ودون تزوير أو قمع! لا يوجد أدنى شك فى أن البرادعى يدرك ذلك تماما. ولذلك فهو يطرح هذه الشروط التى يعرف كل عاقل أنها لن تتحقق بين يوم وليلة، وأنها تحتاج إلى وقت وجهد لتنفيذها وإلى تغيير فى الآراء والعقلية ويضاعف من صعوبة الموقف أن البرادعى يبدو كمن يصرخ فى البرية

Commenters to the site responded in kind:

“I extend my regards to every honorable citizen concerned about the interest of our homeland and people,” said one called Magda.

“I believe that God has bestowed His blessings upon Egypt by sending us Dr. ElBaradei. We have to cling to this chance, for he is the only hope and solution for our country’s problems. His own traits testify to the fact that he would be able to resolve all our problems: He is an honorable, righteous, honest man who would eliminate corruption, bribery and favoritism.”

تحياتى لكل مواطن شريف يهمه مصلحة هذا الوطن وهذا الشعب وأرى أن الله أراد بمصر خيراً أن أرسل لها د البرادعى وعلينا أن نتمسك بهذه الفرصه ولا نضيعها فهو الأمل والحل الوحيد لكل مشاكل هذا البلد فهو يحمل صفات تحل مشاكل هذا البلد جميعاً وهى : فهو رجل شريف ونزيه وصادق ليقضى على الفساد والرشوه والمحسوبيه والمنافقين والطفيليين الذين نهبوا ثرو

Writing on Meedan, one of the Egyptian users commenting on the story struck a more balanced tone, criticizing the state media attacks on ElBaradei’s personality but also questioning ElBaradei’s fitness to govern:

“As an Egyptian man, Mohammad ElBaradei has all the right to imply or to talk frankly about nominating himself, that I can understand. The attacks and distortion of the man’s image in the state run newspapers are also fathomable because he simply represents the opposite of what they stand for. However, what I just cannot get is the blind support for the man from those who’d like him to run for president. They support him unconditionally without considering his program or how he views Egypt’s problems and their solutions.”

محمد البردعى كرجل مصرى من حقه أن يتكلم عن ترشيح نفسه مباشرهً أو تلميحا فهذا مفهوم .. وما حدث بالجرائد الحكوميه من هجوم وتشويه لصوره الرجل أيضا مفهوم لأنه يمثل الصوت النقيض لقناعتهم .. لكن الغير مفهوم من مؤيدى الترشيح أن تتخطى مؤازرتهم للرجل حد موافقتهم على الترشيح إلى التسليم والدعم بلا سقف دون النظر لبرنامجه وكيف يرى المشكلات فى مصر وكيف يرى الحل

– Thanks to Tom El Rumi, Nouran, Rania, Deena and Malika for help with these translations.–

You can add your voice on ElBaradei’s possible presidential bid on www.Meedan.net.

Picture from Barack Obama's photostream on Flickr.com.

Barack Obama will head to Turkey following the G20 summit in London for his first visit to a Muslim country in power.

The U.S. President is expected to address Turkey’s parliament and talk with opposition parties during the trip.

But aides have stressed the visit is not being planned as a platform for speaking to the wider Muslim world, according to Hurriyet newspaper.

U.S. officials do not want the visit to extend beyond bilateral affairs, the paper reports.

However, Obama is expected to take part in a major dialogue conference being organized in Istanbul.

The UN Alliance of Civilizations Forum will bring together civil society organizations from around the world to discuss mechanisms for improving inter-cultural understanding.

The forum will address how cultural understanding is affected by issues relating to new media, women, youth, education and migration.

Spanish President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will join Turkish premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as conference guests.

If Obama does make the conference, it will further reinforce the shift in U.S. foreign policy under his leadership which has already seen him take signficant steps to bring Iran and other Middle Eastern states into dialogue.